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Buddhist philosophers have investigated the techniques and methodologies of debate and 
argumentation which are important aspects of Buddhist intellectual life. This was particularly 
the case in India, where Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy originated (see Buddhist 
Philosophy, Indian § 4; Epistemology, Indian Schools of § 1; Knowledge, Indian Views of; 
and Inference, Indian theories of). But these investigations have also engaged philosophers in 
China, Japan, Korea and Tibet, and many other parts of the world that have been influenced by 
Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy (see Buddhist Philosophy, Chinese; Buddhist Philosophy, 
Japanese; Buddhist Philosophy, Korean; and Tibetan Philosophy).  
 
Several elements of the Buddhist tradition of philosophy are thought to be part of this 
investigation. There are interesting reasoning patterns discernible in the writings of Buddhist 
philosophers. For instance, the Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna presents arguments for the 
emptiness of all things in terms of catuṣkoṭi (four ‘corners’: roughly speaking, truth, false, both, 
neither). There are also the Indian vāda (debate) literature and Tibetan bsdus grwa (collected 
topics) that list techniques of debates. 
 
The main interest here is the tradition of Buddhist philosophy, sometimes referred to as 
Pramāṇavāda, whose central figures are Dignāga (approx. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (6th–
7th CE) (see Dignāga and Dharmakīrti). This philosophy is understood to be the Buddhist 
school of logic-epistemology. ‘Pramāṇavāda’ is not a doxographical term traditionally used to 
refer to a recognised school of Buddhist philosophy. It is a conventional term that is sometimes 
used in modern literature. Nevertheless, in what follows, we think of it as a tradition within 
Buddhist philosophy and ‘Buddhist logic’ refers to what is developed in this tradition. 
 
Buddhist logicians have systematically analysed the kind of reasoning involved in acquiring 
knowledge. They hold that there are valid ways to reason that are productive of knowledge. In 
what follows, some of the main elements of their analyses will be described. Note, however, 
that, while exegetical studies of Buddhist texts are important, we must step back from them 
and consider what is involved in taking a Buddhist approach to logic in light of modern formal 
logic. This analysis will be done against the backdrop of the contemporary literature on logic 





Before discussing Buddhist logic, we should be clear about what we mean by ‘logic’ and how 
it is understood in contemporary philosophy. The nature of logic is debatable, and there is no 
uncontroversial answer. However, the following brief presentation should fix the reference and 
serve as the basis for a comparison with Buddhist logic. 
 
We are familiar with asking for reasons. When we make a claim or present an idea, our 
interlocutor often asks why a claim is correct or we think we have the right idea. When we are 
asked to provide reasons for our claims or ideas, we offer reasons to show we know what we 
are talking about. Some of the reasons we offer may not satisfy our interlocutor, while others 
do. Logic, at least as it is understood in philosophy, is about the reasons that make our claims 
or ideas true. Logic is concerned with the reasons that support the truth of the claim or idea 
that we want our interlocutor to accept. 
 
To introduce some terminology, the reasons we give are called the premises and the claim or 
idea that we want to prove to be true based on the reasons is called the conclusion. Logic is 
concerned with the relationship between the premises and the conclusion, in particular the 
relationship that preserves truth between the premises and the conclusion. In other words, logic 
is concerned with the truth-preserving relation between the premises and the conclusion, where 
if all the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. 
 
This relation between the premises and the conclusion is usually understood to be formal in 
contemporary literature on logic. The formal conception of logic is dominant in the so-called 
‘West’ (see Logic in the 19th century; Logic in the early 20th century). What is involved in the 
formal conception is a complex question. According to the formal conception, logical relations 
that preserve truth from the premises to the conclusion are abstracted from our mental states or 
cognitions involved in inferring the conclusion based on the premises. This means that logical 
relations are not cognitive relations or relations between cognitive states. According to the 
formal conception, logic is not about our thoughts but the forms (or structure) they take or 
should take. The reason we give (premise) must have certain formal or structural relation the 
conclusion to count as a valid reason. 
 
 
2. Buddhist Logic 
 
Buddhist logicians identify inference (anumāna) as one of two valid means of acquiring (or 
sources of) knowledge (pramāṇa), the other being perception (pratyakṣa). For instance, when 
we see smoke on a mountain, we may infer that there is fire on the mountain. If there is indeed 
fire on the mountain (in other words, if it is true that fire is present on the mountain), we are 
said to have acquired knowledge about the smoky mountain, and inference is the means for 
obtaining that knowledge. 
 
Buddhist logicians hold that, for inference to be a valid means of acquiring knowledge, the 
reason (hetu) we give to infer a conclusion must have three characteristics (trirūpahetu). These 
characteristics are: (1) The reason must be applicable to the case we are reasoning about. (2) 
The reason must hold in some case similar to the case in question (sapakṣa). (3) The reason 
must not hold in any case dissimilar to the case in question (vipakṣa). Characteristic two and 
three are called vyāpti, often translated as pervasion. They ensure that the reason has certain 
properties in relation to what we conclude about the case in question. For instance, in inferring 
the presence of fire on a mountain from the presence of smoke on the mountain, (1) smoke 
must be present on the mountain, (2) smoke must be present in some similar cases such as a 
wood-burning stove in a kitchen (where fire is present), and (3) smoke must not be present in 
all dissimilar cases such as a misty lake (where fire is not present). 
 
Buddhist logicians are, thus, concerned with the question of what counts as valid reasons just 
like their contemporary Western counterparts. However, there are a couple of important 
differences. First, Buddhist logicians are mainly concerned with cognition and how it 
transitions. That is, they are concerned with a series of thoughts arising one after the other in 
such a way that knowledge is generated as a result. Importantly, they do not recognise formal 
principles or rules that are independent of cognition or thought involved in making an inference. 
For Buddhist logicians, logical inquiries are about the nature of inferential cognition and how 
they generate knowledge. 
 
To see this, consider how Buddhist logicians identify and discuss two kinds of inference. One 
is called inference for oneself (svārthānumāna). It is inference that we perform in acquiring 
knowledge for ourselves. Another is called inference for others (parārthānumāna). It is 
essentially a statement of inference rather than inference itself. Inference for others is an 
inference in the form of a statement that we present to others or interlocutors so that they can 
go through the inference by themselves. Buddhist logicians think that inference for oneself is 
primary (at least in the case of Dharmakīrti) because, unless a series of cognitions arise, we 
may have another thought, but, strictly speaking, we are not making an inference. 
 
Second, for Buddhist logicians, the reason we provide is not a thought or a proposition that 
expresses the content of a thought, but it is a ‘thing’ we may encounter. For instance, based on 
seeing smoke as we hike up a mountain, we may infer that there is fire on the mountain. In this 
case, the smoke we see on the mountain, rather than the thought that there is smoke on the 
mountain, is the reason for inferring the presence of fire. In the same way, what is inferred is 
not a thought or a proposition; rather, what is inferred is that fire is present on the mountain. 
 
This second difference is important as inference is existentially committing for Buddhist 
logicians. That is, inferential cognition has to depend on how things are. Buddhist logicians 
(Dignāga and Dharmakīrti at least) have the metaphysical view that only individual or distinct 
particulars exist. These particular objects can only be perceived. When we conceive of, for 
instance, a cow, we are said to be aware of a conceptual object, a ‘cow’, which results from 
superimposing mental constructions involving universals to categorise multiple particulars to 
conceptualise a particular object as a cow. Inference is considered to involve such 
conceptualisation.  
 
Even though inference involves conceptualisation, it must depend on individual particulars. 
These particulars can satisfy human desires and needs. It is particular paracetamol pills or the 
molecules contained in the pills that reduce pain (or the experience of pain). However, given 
that all paracetamol, aspirin and ibuprofen pills reduce pain, we see them all as similar and 
falling under the concept ‘pain reliever’. So, while the particular fire on the mountain is a pure 
particular with no resemblance at all to the fire in the kitchen, it is useful to conceptualise them 
as things that we use to satisfy our desires or needs, such as warming ourselves ((2) of the 
trirūpahetu). The fire on the mountain is similar to the fire in the kitchen, unlike a misty lake, 
which is not useful in warming ourselves ((3) of the trirūpahetu). However, whether or not the 
fire on the mountain or the fire in the kitchen satisfy our desires does not depend on how they 
are conceived, but rather depends on the causal capacities of the fire on the mountain and the 
fire in the kitchen. Thus, inference (i.e., inferential cognition) is existentially committing even 
if it involves conceptualisation. 
 
 
3. Buddhist Philosophy of Logic 
 
We are now able to observe an important difference between Buddhist philosophy of logic and 
the formal conception of logic. Before elaborating on this, it is important to note that the 
difference is not something that Buddhist logicians themselves have entertained. It is an 
implication of their focus on cognition and existential commitment rather than something that 
comes directly from their texts. This implication can best be derived by contrasting the 
Buddhist philosophy of logic with the formal conception of logic, particularly the different 
natures and roles that those conceptions assign to the cognitions contained in logical reasoning. 
 
Under formal conception, what matters in the validly of inferring that there is fire on a mountain 
from the premise that there is smoke is the truth-preserving relationship between the 
propositions that express the premises and the conclusion. So, under the formal conception, if 
the proposition that there is fire on the mountain is true provided that the premises are true, 
then the cognition of fire may be considered validly inferred from the cognition of smoke on 
the mountain. In such a case, the status of being a knowledge state is transferred from the 
cognition of the premises (premises-cognition) to the cognition of the conclusion (conclusion-
cognition). What issues this transference is the formal principles that are abstracted from any 
aspects of the cognitions involved. 
 
For Buddhist logicians, in contrast, because inference is understood to be existentially 
committing and, thus, it depends on particulars, what accounts for the knowledge status of the 
cognition of fire on a mountain following the cognition of smoke is the fire on the mountain. 
In other words, the cognition of fire following the cognition of smoke on a mountain counts as 
knowledge because the world is cooperating with our way of conceptualising what we think of 
as fire and what we think of as smoke. So, for Buddhist logicians, inference depends on what 
happens on the ground rather than the principles that are abstracted from and, thus, not about 
the world. 
 
To briefly elaborate on this second difference between Buddhist philosophy of logic and the 
formal conception of logic, consider a cognition of fire following a cognition of smoke on the 
mountain, but the cognition of fire (conclusion-cognition) has arisen spontaneously. According 
to the formal conception, if it is true that there is fire on the mountain on the basis that there is 
smoke on the mountain, the inference counts as valid. So, if the premises-cognition (the 
cognition of smoke) is identified as a knowledge state, the status of being knowledge may be 
transferred to the conclusion-cognition. 
 
In contrast, Buddhist logicians understand inferential cognition to be unified. An inferential 
cognition has an object for the person who infers. If the occurrences of the premises-cognition 
and the conclusion-cognition are disconnected in the way that the formal conception allows, 
then the conclusion-cognition may be concerned with something other than what the premises-
cognition is concerned with. In that case, there is no guarantee that the inferential cognition 
that brings together the premises-cognition and the conclusion-cognition has an object. 
Therefore, for Buddhist logicians, inference is not a mere concatenation of premises-cognition 
and conclusion-cognition that happen to arise one after the other. For them, inferential 
cognitions must be unified. That is, the arising of the conclusion-cognition cannot be 
accidental: the conclusion-cognition arises because of the premises-cognition. Thus, for 
Buddhist logicians, a conclusion-cognition is not one whose knowledge status is transferred 
from the premises-conclusion, but it is the generation of our knowledge.  
 
 
4. Taking a Buddhist Approach to Logic 
 
The main lesson of taking a Buddhist approach to logic is that we can challenge some of the 
widely accepted ideas about the nature of logic in contemporary literature from Buddhist 
perspectives. There are mainly two challenges, (1) against anti-psychologism and (2) against 





Psychologism is the view that logic describes, and thus is dependent on, the metal states or 
cognition involved in our reasoning processes (see Psychologism). Since the late 19th century, 
this view is largely rejected in contemporary literature on the philosophy of logic. One main 
line of thought against psychologism is that if logic were descriptive, it would be hard to 
conceive its normative significance. That is, if logic is concerned with cognition, it may tell us 
what inferences we perform, but it cannot tell us what inferences we ought to make. And, if we 
cannot distinguish between what inferences we make and what inferences we should make, 
then we cannot distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ inferences. Thus, it is argued that logic must be 
independent of cognition. 
 
As we saw above, Buddhist logicians’ primary focus is on cognition, particularly how to bring 
about cognition that can be identified as knowledge which suggests that they are committed to 
psychologism, although none of them would describe their views as such. However, they have 
never encountered anti-psychologism. So, there is no explicit Buddhist response to the anti-
psychologist’s charge against psychologism. What we can do in response would have to be a 
reconstruction as a result of understanding the implications of what they say about inference 
rather than a textual analysis. Strictly speaking, we have to leave Buddhist logicians on the side 
and think alongside them rather than let them speak by themselves. 
 
To distinguish what inferences we do make and those we should make, anti-psychologists 
would have to make sense of what inferences we should make independently of the inferences 
we do make. To do this, they would have to appeal to something other than the cognition 
involved in making inferences. Anti-psychologists, then, would have to explain how something 
abstracted from cognition can, nevertheless, apply to cognition. This is where Buddhist 
logicians would most likely interject. 
 
For Buddhist logicians, inference is a means to acquire knowledge. In particular, it is thought 
to bring about specific knowledge. In the case of inferring that there is fire on a mountain based 
on seeing smoke, the inference is about the smoky mountain. It is hard to think that something 
abstracted from inference about a smoky mountain can specify how such inference should go. 
First, because it is not part of the cognition of smoke, formal principles do not contribute to the 
arising of the cognition of fire. So, it is not sufficient for bringing about knowledge about the 
smoky mountain. Second, the arising of the cognition of fire may result from cognising about 
smoke rather than the result of the cognition of fire having a certain formal relation with the 
cognition of smoke. So formal principles are not necessary for bringing about knowledge about 
the smoky mountain. 
 
Therefore, from a Buddhist logician’s perspective, anti-psychologists place norms in the wrong 
place. Instead of placing them in the world that we interact with, they let them float above 
inference, hoping that they can oversee inferential activity. Buddhist logicians would find this 
way of understanding the normative dimension of inference objectionable and would challenge 
anti-psychologism on that basis. 
 
 
4.2. A Priori 
 
An important issue connected to psychologism and anti-psychologism is the alleged a priori 
nature of logic. There are several ways in which logic is thought to be a priori. First, logic is 
thought to be a priori in the sense that our experiences do not invalidate logical principles. In 
this sense, logic can be considered similar to arithmetic, where seeing that two cups of water 
becoming one (large) cup of water should not change the status of 1 + 1 = 2. 
 
Second, logic is sometimes thought to be a priori in the sense that logical principles are not 
generalisable from particular cognitions involved in reasoning. Particular cognitions depend 
on the contingency of experience, whereas logical principles are the conditions for knowledge 
in general and, thus, do not depend on experience. As Kant put it, logical principles are canon 
but not organon of the understanding in general. 
 
Third, logic is sometimes thought to be a priori in the sense that logical principles must be in 
place for the development and testing of theories, whether empirical or otherwise, to take place. 
Or, to put it in the context of reasoning, logical principles must be in place prior to valid or 
invalid reasoning to be identifiable. The thought is that if logical principles can tell us what 
valid and invalid reasonings are, they cannot be part of the reasoning that is being evaluated; 
they must be prior to reasoning that can be said to be valid or invalid. 
 
Again, ‘a priori’ did not enter the Buddhist lexicon, nor did the concept of a priori enter 
Buddhist philosophy. Nevertheless, we can see that Buddhist logicians would reject all three 
forms of a priori. As we saw before, when they talk about inference, Buddhist logicians are 
talking about cognition. Importantly, they do not recognise any principles or anything law-like 
abstracted from cognition but that, nevertheless, function as governing it. Hence, Buddhist 
logicians would reject the third form of a priori. This also means that there is only particular 
cognitions to be investigated. So, they would also reject the second form of a priori. Finally, if 
there is nothing outside of the inferential process against which inference can be evaluated, 
validity is something that is embedded in people’s inferential cognition. If so, rejection or 
revision of logical principles can be triggered only by observing the processes of inferential 
cognition. Hence, Buddhist logicians would also reject the first form of a priori. Thus, they 
can be considered committed to rejecting all three forms of a priori as applied to logic. 
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